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Article
Two faces of party system stability:
Programmatic change and party
replacement
Endre Borbáth
Freie Universität Berlin, Germany; WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Germany
Abstract
Despite extensive research on party system stability, the concept is often reduced to the survival of existing parties. This
article argues for introducing programmatic stability as a separate dimension and shows how the combination of party
replacement and programmatic instability shapes patterns of party competition. Based on their interaction, the article
distinguishes four ideal types: stable systems, systems with empty party labels, systems with ephemeral parties, and general
instability. The empirical analysis relies on media data and proposes a new measure of programmatic stability to study its
interaction with party replacement in fifteen European countries during the period of the economic crisis. As the article
shows, the two dimensions shape the transformation of party systems in northwestern, southern, and eastern Europe.
Relying on multidimensional scaling, the article analyzes in detail the cases of the United Kingdom, Romania, Ireland, and
Latvia to showcase party competition under different conditions of systemic instability.
Keywords
cleavages, Europe, Great Recession, party system stability, political parties
Introduction
More than 40 years ago, Sartori provided one of the most
widely cited definitions in political science, defining party
systems as “the system of interactions resulting from inter-
party competition” (1976: 44). While interactions might
take different forms, their stability—a key attribute in any
party system—is often reduced to organizational turnover.
This article’s central claim is that the stability of the pro-
grammatic offer is equally important, and despite the com-
mon assumption, it does not always align with the survival
of parties as organizations. Reducing stability to a one-
dimensional view runs the risk of equating party systems
of different types. Latvia, for instance, is commonly
referred to as a party system where “new parties of previous
elections lose to even newer entrants, resulting in an essen-
tially new party system every four to eight years” (Haugh-
ton and Deegan-Krause, 2015: 68). Yet the newer (and
newer) formations mobilize a stable cleavage structure. In
contrast, Ireland is characterized by “more or less the same
parties competing and with more or less the same degree of
success, through election after election, through decade
after decade, and through generation after generation,”
despite the lack of a strong cleavage structure (Mair,
1997: 15). In the first case, programmatic stability is com-
bined with party replacement; in the second case, party
survival is combined with programmatic transformations,
demonstrating the importance of distinguishing these two
faces of party system stability.
Despite a recent increase in scholarly interest in party
system stability, studies that examine the interaction of
party replacement and programmatic change are lacking.
Most studies focus on one of these dimensions (Ibenskas
and Sikk, 2017; Sikk, 2005, 2011; Whitefield and Rohrsch-
neider, 2009), providing measures of programmatic
instability (Rovny and Polk, 2017) or party replacement
(Marinova, 2016; Powell and Tucker, 2013; Sikk and
Köker, 2019). A number of studies focus on stability at the
level of individual parties without taking a systemic per-
spective on party competition into account (Barnea and
Rahat, 2011; Ibenskas and Sikk, 2017; Litton, 2015). The
Paper submitted 16 May 2019; accepted for publication 18 March 2020
Corresponding author:
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related literature on party system institutionalization in
Europe has a narrow focus on government formation (Casal
Bértoa and Enyedi, 2016) and does not consider the parlia-
mentary arena. The sociological literature on cleavages and
their role in anchoring party competition focuses on new
party entry and pays less attention to programmatic change
by existing parties (Hooghe and Marks, 2018). This article
systematically incorporates both dimensions. More specif-
ically, it examines party replacement, defined as the disap-
pearance of existing parties and the entry of genuinely new
parties. Programmatic instability, in turn, is defined as
change in the programmatic supply represented in the party
system. As this article argues, their interaction defines dif-
ferent types of party system stability, herein observed
across Europe.
Although a consensus exists concerning the importance
of party system stability, the literature is characterized by
different normative assumptions regarding its optimal
level. More specifically, the literature on western Europe
and north America focuses on change amidst stability and
examines the evolution of programmatic positions in rela-
tion to long-term transformations (e.g. Kriesi et al., 2012)
or short-term responsiveness (e.g. Adams et al., 2004).
From this perspective, the evolution of issue positions is
normatively desirable and seldom considered to be a
dimension of instability. A slightly different view domi-
nates the literature on new democracies, which developed
largely independently. Given the high levels of electoral
volatility, scholars of new democracies examine stability
amidst change and express more concern regarding parties’
ability to provide stable choices (Mair, 1997: 196–197;
Rovny and Polk, 2017; Whitefield and Rohrschneider,
2009). Among the handful of comparative studies that
exist, Marinova (2016) finds a negative effect of organiza-
tional turnover on voters’ ability to navigate the complexity
of parties’ programmatic offer, while Piñeiro Rodrı́guez
and Rosenblatt (2018) argue that some level of instability
is desirable to allow the party system to adapt to changing
societal conditions.
Concerning the optimal threshold of change, Whitefield
and Rohrschneider (2009) suggest examining the precondi-
tions to electoral accountability as a normative ideal. While
they only focus on the programmatic dimension—as the
article argues—it is the interaction of party replacement
and programmatic instability that hinders electoral
accountability. Asking how the dynamic of party replace-
ment and programmatic change relate in a cross-national
setting, the article discusses the conceptual distinction
between the two. I present four ideal types to illustrate their
interaction: (1) generally stable systems with a recurring
programmatic offer represented by the same parties; (2)
systems with empty labels where the programmatic offer
is in a state of flux, although parties endure; (3) systems
with ephemeral parties where the programmatic offer is
stable despite party turnover; and (4) general instability
where both the programmatic offer and parties change.
Next to introducing the two dimensions and the above
typology, this article proposes a methodological innova-
tion, developing a new measure of programmatic stability
which considers changes in two party and in two campaign
level characteristics. At the party level, the measure incor-
porates issue positions and their salience, and at the cam-
paign level, the measure incorporates the systemic salience
of issues and the relative importance of parties. While these
elements are partly present in data sets of party manifestos
or expert surveys, this article relies on media data to pro-
vide estimates of all four of them and examine program-
matic stability at the party system level. The focus on the
media and electoral campaigns allows me to observe par-
ties as seen by voters and subsequently map the stability of
the party system based on these estimates.
This article starts by detailing a conceptual model of the
two faces of stability: party replacement and programmatic
change. It reviews the literature on party system stability to
provide an integrated framework of analysis across north-
western, southern, and eastern Europe. The empirical anal-
ysis maps the two components and provides an in-depth
discussion of the dynamic of party systems in Ireland, Lat-
via, Romania, and the United Kingdom. The conclusion
argues for the importance of differentiating the stability
of parties from the stability of the programmatic structure.
Theoretical considerations
Party turnover and programmatic change
Ever since Lipset and Rokkan’s (1966) “freezing
hypothesis,” stability has been recognized as a defining
characteristic of any party system. However, stability is
conceptualized and measured in an overly reductionist
way. There are several indicators used such as electoral
volatility, the effective number of parties, or aggregated
party age. Despite warnings from Mair with regards to
equating social and political change when interpreting
changes in the Pedersen index of volatility (1997: 86–89),
the indicator is the most commonly used (most recently:
Emanuele et al., 2020). As highlighted by Mainwaring et al.
(2010) and Powell and Tucker (2013), the index conflates
changes in voters’ preferences between existing parties
with the “mechanic effect” of voters having to face a dif-
ferent set of party choices on offer. To calculate its values,
parties need to be traced back across elections, a nontrivial
task in unstable systems. Researchers, relying on party
labels, face difficult choices in coding coalitions, mergers,
splits, and new party entries. Not surprisingly, the index has
a wide range of values depending on the rules for equating
parties across elections (Casal Bértoa et al., 2017).
More importantly for the scope of the current article, the
Pedersen index, the effective number of parties, and party
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age measure different aspects of organizational stability
and do not capture programmatic change. High organiza-
tional continuity, that is, low party replacement, only
reflects the extent to which parties survive, independent
of a change in what they represent. Therefore, a measure
of organizational change only provides limited information
about the broader concept of party system stability and does
not capture the extent to which the choices represented in
the system change over time.
To my knowledge, there are only two comparative stud-
ies that go beyond these indicators and analyze program-
matic stability at the party system level. Whitefield and
Rohrschneider (2009) distinguish between menu, source,
programmatic, and dynamic consistency. The first two,
menu and source, apply at the party system level and mea-
sure the extent to which parties emphasize/position them-
selves on relevant cleavages and whether the same parties
represent similar positions/emphasis over time. Rovny and
Polk (2017) provide measures of the programmatic struc-
ture of party competition with dimensional cohesiveness,
as well as expert uncertainty, the relationship between the
economic and cultural dimensions, and the impact of eco-
nomic over cultural issues on voters’ choices. Both studies
contribute to the debate on instability in eastern Europe and
find high levels of programmatic stability. However, they
both face two important limitations.
First, the empirical analyses in both studies are based on
expert surveys of party positions, and in the case of White-
field and Rohrschneider (2009), party-level issue salience.
Expert surveys have the advantage of providing direct mea-
sures of abstract concepts, like party positions on underly-
ing issue dimensions. However, they face limitations in
their ability to capture change over time. In their review,
Bakker and Hobolt (2013) show that experts tend to take a
long-term perspective and underestimate the impact of
recent developments. The problem is especially acute in
the case of the study by Whitefield and Rohrschneider
(2009) who rely on two relatively closely timed expert
surveys (2003–2004 and 2007). In addition to underesti-
mating change, the widely used Chapel Hill Expert Survey
(CHES) (Bakker et al., 2015) is not linked to national elec-
tions. As a consequence of its uniform timing, the extent to
which the survey captures programmatic shifts during the
campaign—a crucial period for forming and informing vot-
ers’ choices—is country specific and close to random.
Second, neither of the two studies conceptually deline-
ates or empirically estimates an organizational aspect of
instability. Rovny and Polk (2017) discuss programmatic
instability as a separate dimension but do not develop the
concept of organizational turnover. Whitefield and
Rohrschneider (2009) test the robustness of their findings
against parties falling out or entering their sample, but
despite the magnitude of the phenomenon (22% and
28%) they do not conceptualize party replacement as a
separate dimension.
Given the limited geographical scope of both studies,
the extent to which the findings apply outside of eastern
Europe remains open. Most evidence of stability in western
European countries is based on low electoral volatility.
Although recent values of volatility came close to the east-
ern European benchmark (Emanuele et al., 2020), without a
measure of programmatic instability the assessment of
change concerning the level and the trend of instability are
incomplete.
The distinction between the two dimensions of party
replacement and programmatic stability is even more
important when they point in different directions and, for
instance, parties change while the programmatic structure
stays the same. In such a situation, the party system shows
signs of stability scholars should not overlook. Program-
matic stability is a conceptually distinct dimension of party
system stability which interacts with party replacement.
Table 1 provides an overview of the four ideal forms of
stability that the two dimensions define.
Although both dimensions form continuums, the two-
by-two table introduces four ideal types defined by their
relationship. Between the most stable systems where the
same parties survive with reasonably consistent program-
matic appeal, and general instability, in which neither
parties nor the programmatic structure survive, two new
categories appear. In systems where party replacement is
low but the programmatic appeal of parties is highly vola-
tile, party labels become empty signifiers. The lack of
clear alternatives incentivizes voters to make their choices
on nonprogrammatic grounds and hurts the chain of elec-
toral accountability. In the opposite situation, that of
ephemeral parties with relatively stable programmatic
structures, voters find parties with fitting programmatic
appeal; however, the turnover of parties creates difficul-
ties in forming lasting attachments. Systems that score
low on both dimensions are the most worrisome, but only
appear momentarily. General instability undermines the
development of the type of interactions that party sys-
tems—in the Sartorian sense—necessitate. In this regard,
instability is not a stable form of equilibrium; if it tempo-
rarily emerges, it signals the lack of systemic interactions
between individual parties.
As the typology suggests, it is unlikely that the two
forms of stability will consistently covary and align on a
single dimension. Therefore, I expect party replacement
Table 1. A typology of party system instability.
Party Replacement
Low High
Programmatic
instability
High Empty labels General instability
Low General stability Ephemeral parties
Borbáth 3
and the stability of the programmatic structure to constitute
different dimensions of party system stability.
Change amidst stability, stability amidst change
The comparative literature on party system stability in Eur-
opean countries is strongly influenced by the geographical
focus of the analysis. Two strands can be distinguished, one
focusing on western—understood as northwestern and
southern—Europe and the other on eastern European coun-
tries. The first and older strand of the literature is primarily
concerned with patterns of change amidst realigning party
systems. The second and newer strand studies the precon-
ditions of forming stable party systems in the postcommu-
nist period. Recently, southern European countries have
more often been regarded as a separate object of inquiry,
given the transformative role of the economic crisis in that
region. Most analyses focus on regional differences;
dynamics at the country and election level are less often
compared.
Although northwestern European party systems are
more stable than the party systems in the other two regions,
they are far from being immune to change (e.g. Hutter and
Kriesi, 2019). Their evolution is typically analyzed from a
strategic or a cleavage perspective. The strategic perspec-
tive posits that change in this region is primarily program-
matic, the result of mainstream parties adopting the issue
positions of their competitors either to form new coalitions
or to divide their opposition (e.g. Green-Pedersen, 2019).
The cleavage perspective argues that change is a result of
new party entry, the appearance of a “transnational”
(Hooghe and Marks, 2018), or “integration-demarcation”
cleavage (Hutter and Kriesi, 2019; Kriesi et al., 2012),
mobilized by the radical right. The two perspectives
diverge regarding the actors driving programmatic shifts
and the pattern of change these party systems reflect:
election-specific, sudden ruptures, explained by the chang-
ing fortunes of the mainstream competitors, versus long-
term, gradual shifts, driven by societal transformations.
The party systems in southern Europe followed a differ-
ent path of development, not least due to being formed as a
result of a democratization process starting later than in
northwestern Europe (except Italy). Without overstating
their precrisis stability, the pattern of competition in these
party systems was to a large degree predictable, differing
from northwestern Europe in having a relatively low num-
ber of effective parties, without significant radical right or
new left forces. However, the once-stable southern Eur-
opean party systems were the least able to weather the
shock of the economic crisis and have seen (e.g. in Italy)
some of the most successful new parties arise in its wake.
Not least due to the entry of these new actors, the crisis
changed the previous pattern of competition and has led to
a rise in party system fragmentation.
In contrast to the literature on northwestern and southern
European countries, which can be characterized as the
study of change amidst stability, the literature on eastern
European countries has long been concerned with identify-
ing stability amidst change. Most of the literature on party
system instability, especially prior to the Great Recession,
discussed the development of party competition in post-
communist countries. These systems are characterized by
much higher electoral volatility than is observed in estab-
lished democracies (Powell and Tucker, 2013). While the
region is often considered a place where parties compete
without being institutionalized and new parties enter with-
out representing a programmatically different alternative
(Sikk, 2011), some studies revealed systematic patterns.
For instance, Haughton and Deegan-Krause (2015) demon-
strated that new parties appeal to a specific segment of the
electorate, those with an appetite for newness across elec-
tions. These parties form a party subsystem, which in turn
contributes to party turnover.
The previous literature expects that the two dimen-
sions—party replacement and the stability of the program-
matic structure—are most distinct in the eastern European
context of high organizational turnover. Nevertheless, the
previous literature also demonstrated that stability is a
country-level phenomenon with considerable within-
regional variance (Green-Pedersen, 2019; Haughton and
Deegan-Krause, 2015). Given the transformation of north-
western European countries and the effects of the crisis in
southern Europe, I expect the stability of the programmatic
structure and party replacement to constitute two separate
dimensions across Europe, with considerable inter-country
differences.
Data and measures
Programmatic volatility
As a systemic property, party system stability should not
only reflect the sum of change at the level of individual
parties but consider their interaction as well (Mair, 1997:
45–75; Sartori, 1976). At the party level, this implies con-
sidering shifts in (1) issue positions and (2) the emphasis of
issue stances. At the campaign level, there are two addi-
tional elements: (3) the systemic salience of issues and (4)
the standing of parties, that is, their ability to influence the
campaign. Not all issues are discussed to the same extent
and not all parties are equally important. An internally valid
measure considers all four components.
Parties’ programmatic offer is most often measured with
expert surveys, manifestos, or media data. The three com-
monly used sources are CHES, the Comparative Manifesto
Project (CMP) (Volkens et al., 2017), and Kriesi et al.’s
(2012) core sentences dataset. These are complementary
but also make different choices on trade-offs that “cannot
be simultaneously optimized” (Bakker and Hobolt, 2013:
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30). The previous section introduced the advantages and
disadvantages of the CHES. The main strength of CHES
lies in its measures of parties’ issue positions. Unfortu-
nately, it does not cover issue salience at the party level
over time. CMP maps party level salience based on national
election manifestos over a long period of time. However, it
does not allow me to distinguish programmatic and orga-
nizational stability due to parties in pre-electoral coalitions
not issuing separate manifestos. Since many parties enter
similar coalition agreements, change in their programmatic
offer is conflated with change in their organizational basis.
Position estimates are indirectly available, by aggregating
the salience of mutually exclusive issues. Neither CHES
nor CMP covers the systemic salience of issues and both
measure the standing of parties indirectly through their vote
share. The latter is problematic since vote share is an
unknown quantity at the time when parties settle their pro-
grammatic positions and it is—at least partly—a function
of the programmatic appeal they form.
The core sentences data—presented in Online Supple-
mental Material B—covers the campaign dynamic of par-
liamentary elections, based on the coverage of two daily
national newspapers in each country (Hutter and Kriesi
2019; Kriesi et al., 2012). The data set is constructed
according to the rules for core sentence coding, a relational
type of content analysis where each grammatical sentence
is reduced to its “core sentence,” which contains a subject’s
relation to an object. Direction is coded from 1 (full
opposition) to 1 (full support). As media data, it approxi-
mates party’s programmatic offer as seen by voters, which,
as Merz (2017a) shows, strongly correlates with their atti-
tudes. Most importantly, the data set contains information
on the source of each statement at the level of individual
politicians. This allows me to track parties across coalitions
and estimate shifts in positions and the salience of their
stances over time.
The core sentences covers countries from northwestern,
southern, and eastern Europe (Hutter and Kriesi, 2019):
Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In each of these
countries, there was one pre-2008 election coded and the
subsequent ones, until the end of 2017. The data maps a
total of 57 campaigns, three to six per country, a set of
comparable elections fought in the context of the Great
Recession (see Online Supplemental Material A). The
extent of inference beyond this crisis period hinges on the
degree to which the interaction between party replacement
and programmatic instability follows a longer trend.
One concern when it comes to external validity is the
convergence of estimates from media data with expert sur-
veys and party manifestos. Helbling and Tresch (2011)
compare the data of Kriesi et al. (2012) with CHES and
CMP on the European issue and conclude that party posi-
tions reflect the same dimension while issue salience at the
party level diverges. When all issues are compared, Merz
(2017b) shows that the Kriesi et al. (2012) data sets capture
salience and positions as reflected in party manifestos. Hut-
ter and Gessler (2019) compare the updated Kriesi et al.
data set with CMP and find a high correlation between
parties’ issue positions and salience of broader issues. The
correlation is lower when party-level issue salience is com-
pared across more detailed issues. Parties address a higher
number of issues in their manifesto than during the cam-
paign. Hutter and Gessler interpret their results as a sign of
media influence on the salience of individual issues,
although the broader issue agenda and parties’ issue posi-
tions are outside of the control of the media. The latter
result highlights the need to adjust any indicator of stability
for the overall salience of issues in the campaign.
The core sentences data have the advantage of offering a
direct measure of all four components of programmatic
volatility. Party level position is measured with the average
direction of support/opposition of each party on an issue.
Party level salience is measured by the share of core sen-
tences by a party on an issue, relative to the overall number
of core sentences by that party. Systemic issue salience is
measured by the share of core sentences on each issue
relative to the total number of core sentences. Parties’
standing is measured by the share of core sentences by each
party relative to the total number of core sentences.
Starting from the assumption that the more visible shifts
in parties’ positions are, the more important they become,
the indicator of programmatic volatility calculates the
weighted mean of change in the multiplicative term of
party level salience and position. The values are centered
on the party system mean to account for the systemic com-
ponent of instability and estimate change in relative terms.1
Two weights are applied: on the issue level, the systemic
salience of each individual issue; on the party level, the
standing of each party. The programmatic volatility
within-system index is calculated as
PVwithin-system :
Xnj
j¼1
wj 
Xni
i¼1
wi
 jsalienceijt  positionijt  salienceijtþ1  positionijtþ1 j;
where wj stands for the standing of each party (parties’
salience), wi stands for systemic issue salience, and the
horizontal bar stands for mean centering. The index is
applicable if the same parties exist in two consecutive
elections.
In two cases, continuity cannot be established: when a
party disappears and when a genuinely new party enters. In
these two cases, extra-system programmatic volatility
needs to be calculated. To do so, I compare the issue sal-
ience and position in the campaign of the disappearing/
genuinely new party with the previously available set of
choices on that specific issue. The formula takes the pre-
vious or the subsequent time point depending on whether
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the party is newly formed or disappearing. The first part of
the formula captures the extent to which new parties
broaden the programmatic offer previously available. The
second part of the formula captures the extent to which the
disappearance of an established party leads to a more lim-
ited programmatic offer. Applying the same two weights as
before, the corresponding formula builds on the formula of
within-system programmatic volatility:
PVextrasystem :
Xng
g¼1
wg 
Xni
i¼1
wi  jsalienceigtþ1
 positionigtþ1  salienceit  positionit j
þ
Xno
o¼1
wo 
Xni
i¼1
wi  jsalienceitþ1  positionitþ1
 salienceiot  positioniot j;
where wg stands for the standing of genuinely new parties,
which only competed during the election at time t þ 1, and
wo stands for the standing of old parties, which only com-
peted during the election at time t. The measure estimates
the change caused by the entry or the disappearance of
parties. The total level of programmatic volatility is a sum
of both components: change by established formations and
by the death/entry of parties.
Party replacement
To estimate party replacement, I rely on the standard indi-
cator of extra-system volatility. The index was introduced
with the aim of disaggregating electoral volatility into two
components. One component, what Mainwaring et al.
(2010) call extra-system and Powell and Tucker (2013) call
Type A, captures changes in voters’ preferences driven by
supply-side shifts.2 The index is a function of the vote share
of parties that disappear or newly enter from one general
election to the next. As a measure of organizational stabi-
lity, extra-system volatility captures party replacement
weighted by vote share. The closer its values are to zero,
the more established formations secure voter support. In
turn, the higher its values, the more support organization-
ally new parties have.
One concern is the definition of newness, with a large
literature split on how to identify disruptive changes. One
the one hand, part of the relevant literature suggests aban-
doning the dichotomous distinction. At the party level, Lit-
ton (2015) distinguishes two dimensions: novelty in party
attributes and structural affiliation. At the party system
level, Sikk and Köker (2019) suggest incorporating the
extent of continuity as weights in calculating volatility val-
ues. The resulting measures have the advantage of incor-
porating a wealth of context and case-related information.
However, this information is not readily available for all
party-election dyads, and even when available the weights
to aggregate the internal dimensions of newness remain
arbitrary. On the other hand, another strand of the literature
introduces a threshold to maintain the dichotomous distinc-
tion, in line with a more intuitive understanding of new-
ness. Sikk (2005) introduces the concept of “genuine
newness” to identify such a dichotomous distinction. He
formulates three criteria: (1) not being successor to a pre-
vious party; (2) having a novel name/structure and; (3) not
having an important figure from the past. Given the clarity
and ease to operationalize “genuine newness,” I rely on the
three criteria to distinguish new parties.3
To measure party replacement, I rely on a second data
set — presented in Online Supplemental Material C —
which codes each competing formation in the 57 elections
under consideration. The data set is based on ParlGov (Dör-
ing and Manow, 2019) and includes all parties which
gained more than 1% of the vote in one election in the
sample. I rely on country-specific secondary literature and
online resources to code each electoral formation. The val-
ues represent the average change in vote share attributed to
the entry of a genuinely new party or the death of an old
one. As Online Supplemental Material C shows, the result-
ing measure is highly correlated with alternative measures
of organizational stability used in the literature, based on
the number of times parties have changed the organiza-
tional form in which they compete over time.
Results
Party system stability across Europe
Both programmatic volatility and party replacement show
change in relative terms, always taking the previous elec-
tion as its baseline (see Online Supplemental Material A).
Figure 1 presents a scatterplot of country averages and
election level scores. The reference lines show the median
values.
Neither the country nor the election level figure
shows a linear relationship between the two dimensions.
Kendall’s t (0.05), a measure with no distributional
assumptions, and alternative measures of correlation
corroborate this finding. As the figure shows, the rela-
tionship between the two dimensions reflects the four
ideal types and underscores the importance of distin-
guishing the categories “empty labels” and “ephemeral
parties.”
Among the 15 countries under consideration, Roma-
nia scores the highest on both forms of instability, pri-
marily because of its 2016 elections. Spain is also
relatively high on both dimensions, a result almost
entirely driven by the 2015 election and the break-
through of Podemos and Ciudadanos. The Italian and
Latvian systems are characterized by high rates of party
replacement, but score low on programmatic instability.
The Irish and the Portuguese systems are examples of
low party replacement combined with high
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programmatic instability. The United Kingdom provides
the most stable party system during the period included
in the sample. As expected, conditions of general
instability are only temporarily materialized.
Figure 1 speaks to the expectation regarding instability
in the three regions. Except for France, northwestern Eur-
opean countries have the organizationally most stable
party systems, but a broader range of values in terms of
programmatic volatility. As the figure shows, program-
matic change in this region is only occasionally the result
of new party entry; existing parties change their appeal as
well. Such changes might be due to election-specific fac-
tors or might result from a longer-term characteristic of
the party system (see the example of Ireland below).
Southern Europe stands out for its intra-regional hetero-
geneity in terms of both dimensions, with Italy and Por-
tugal being two extreme cases. In Greece, the issue
repertoire radically changed (also see Online Supplemen-
tal Material E, figures 1 and 2), but most new parties are
linked to those that existed before the crisis.
The four eastern European countries exhibit the organi-
zationally most unstable systems. However, except for
Romania, the three east European countries are program-
matically relatively stable. Note that in the case of Poland,
the first data point comes from 2007 and therefore the data
do not capture the collapse of the postcommunist left and
the Solidarity blocks. In Hungary, despite the electoral col-
lapse of the Socialist party in 2010, the programmatic struc-
ture hardly changed; Jobbik and Fidesz represent similar
positions, opposed by the Socialists and other left-wing
parties.
Overall, these results reveal that the two forms of stabi-
lity are two distinct dimensions, with some form of instabil-
ity present in all three regions. The pattern also points to the
importance of intra-regional heterogeneity and highlights
country-specific dynamics (also see Online Supplemental
Material E, figures 1 and 2). Therefore, I zoom in on the
dynamic in four countries as examples of cases when the
two dimensions of instability align and when they do not.
These four cases exemplify types of instability which
approximate the ideal scenarios previously identified.
Forms of instability
To illustrate programmatic instability and party replace-
ment, I rely on weighted multidimensional scaling. This
method has frequently been used with the core sentences
data set (e.g. Hutter and Kriesi, 2019; Kriesi et al., 2012).
Like factor analysis, the nonparametric method reduces the
number of dimensions, calculates the proximity of the
objects (parties and issues), and results in a graphical rep-
resentation (see Online Supplemental Material D). To esti-
mate parties’ movement, the issue repertoire is fixed—
marked with crosses—and provides the reference points.
As Online Supplemental Material D shows, in all cases
examined the political space is two-dimensional: economic
issues (welfare; economic liberalism) constitute the hori-
zontal dimension and cultural or other issues represent the
second dimension. The angle between the two dimensions
is indicative of the extent to which they correlate.
Parties’ relative distance from an issue is a function of
their support. Each party appears as many times as the
number of elections it contested, provided the sample
includes enough observations. The shape of the symbol
distinguishes between parties. The first observation for
each party is also labeled on the figures. To illustrate pro-
grammatic instability, I rely on arrows to show the move-
ment of the main parties.
I first present the two cases when the two dimensions
align in a relatively stable (the United Kingdom) and a
relatively unstable (Romania) party system. I then present
two additional cases, one of which is a system with empty
labels, programmatic volatility among stable organizations
(Ireland) and the other of which involves ephemeral parties
in a stable programmatic space (Latvia).
Stable and unstable systems: The United Kingdom and Romania.
Figure 2 presents the results of the multidimensional scal-
ing (MDS) analysis of the UK sample based on four elec-
tions (2005, 2010, 2015, and 2017). The arrows show
movements by three major parties: Conservatives, Labour,
and the Liberal Democrats.
With the two main parties among the oldest in Europe,
the United Kingdom shows a remarkable level of organiza-
tional stability. Partially due to the high threshold of the first-
past-the-post system, new party entry is rare. Nevertheless,
in line with the western European pattern of cleavage trans-
formation, two new parties were established at the beginning
of the 1990s: the Greens and the radical right-wing United
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Both parties had their
breakthrough during or shortly before the period of observa-
tion; the Greens during the 2015 general election, UKIP
during the 2004 European Parliamentary Elections.
In line with the strategic perspective, the main source of
programmatic instability is shift by existing, mainstream
parties (see Online Supplemental Material E, figure 3).
These shifts are partly explained by the austerity politics
formulated in response to the economic crisis and partly by
the success of UKIP and the Greens. As the figure shows,
after the 2014 European Parliamentary Elections, the Con-
servative Party shifted toward UKIP. Similarly, over time,
the Labour party visibly moves away from the center and
adopts similar positions to the Greens,4 the Liberal Demo-
crats, and the Scottish National Party (SNP). In 2017, under
Corbyn, the party moved further to the economic left as
well as toward a more pro-EU, culturally liberal position.
Overall, shifts by mainstream parties do not blur the
programmatic differences between the main competitors
and instead polarize the Labour and Conservative parties.
The only “leapfrogging” is associated with the Liberal
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Democrats after they entered government with the Conser-
vatives in the aftermath of the 2010 elections. By the end of
the legislative period, the Liberal Democrats had adopted
many of the positions of the Conservative party, producing
the largest positional shift in the UK sample and typifying
the hard time junior coalition partners have in preserving
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Figure 2. MDS analysis of the political space in the United Kingdom (2005–2017).
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Figure 1. Party replacement and programmatic volatility. (a) Country-level; (b) Election-level.
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their programmatic identity. After their 2015 collapse, the
Liberal Democrats returned in 2017 to their pro-European
and culturally liberal positions.
While these changes are significant, voters face a clear
distinction between the main choices, offered by the same
parties in all elections in the sample. Therefore, the United
Kingdom provides the closest approximation of stable sys-
tems in this sample. In this regard, the comparison to the
Romanian party system presented by Figure 3 based on
four elections (2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016) is striking. In
this case, the arrows show movement by the largest Social
Democratic Party (PSD), and the two main right-wing par-
ties: the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Democratic
Liberal Party (PDL).
From an organizational perspective, the center-left has
been relatively stable and PSD, as the most successful for-
mation, is often regarded as the anchor of party competi-
tion. The party is opposed by a more fragmented right,
mainly represented by PNL and PDL. Before the 2016
elections, PDL merged with PNL. In addition, several small
parties existed, some formally new but linked to politicians
who were in other parties before. Two of these entered
parliament in the most unstable 2016 elections: the Alli-
ance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE) and the People’s
Movement Party (PMP). While genuinely new party entry
is rare, two entered parliament during the period of obser-
vation: in 2012, the People’s Party – Dan Diaconescu
(PPDD) and in 2016 the Save Romania Union (USR).
welfare
ecolib
ecoreform
anti-corrupt
demnew
demreform
nationalism
edu
PD (04)
UDMR (04)
PNL (04)
PSD (04)
PD-L (08)
2008
2008
PC (12)
PD-L (12)
2012
2012
UDMR (16)
PNL (16)
2016
PMP (16)
USR (16)
ALDE (16)
PRU (16)
ALDE
PC
PD
PD-L
PMP
PNL
PRU
PSD
UDMR
USR
0.20
0.2
0
Figure 3. MDS analysis of the political space in Romania (2004–2016).
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From a programmatic perspective, the fight against cor-
ruption dominates party competition, with a third of all core
sentences, but issues related to democratic reform and dem-
ocratic renewal are also salient. The high salience of similar
issues on which parties change their position easily, espe-
cially anti-corruption, contribute the most to programmatic
instability (see Borbáth, 2019 and Online Supplemental
Material E, figures 2 and 4). As Figure 3 shows, the three
main parties, PSD, PDL, and PNL, radically changed their
position vis-à-vis one another, repeatedly changing their
relative order on a given axis of competition. Even the
“anchor” PSD substantially changed its programmatic
appeal over time.
Despite the high instability on both dimensions, espe-
cially during the 2016 elections, PSD and PNL remain
the largest political parties. High volatility on both
dimensions is restricted to specific moments in time, for
example, 2016, which shows the limited empirical valid-
ity of “instability” as a general category. Given the sur-
vival of PSD and PNL, combined with their large
programmatic swings, Romania approximates systems
with empty party labels.
Empty labels and ephemeral parties: Ireland and Latvia. Figure
4 shows the MDS analysis of the Irish party systems based
on three elections (2007, 2011, and 2016). The arrows show
movements of the almost permanent government party
Fianna Fáil (FF) and the “near-permanent opposition” Fine
Gael (FG) (O’Malley and Kerby, 2004: 54). Their polarity
is traced back to the Irish civil wars. The third arrow shows
movement by one of the challenger parties, the republican
Sinn Féin (SF).
Despite the severity of the economic crisis, new parties
that entered, like the Independents 4 Change and Renua,
remained electorally marginal. The reason lies in the ability
of FG and FF to shift their programmatic appeal, primarily
in economic terms (see Online Supplemental Material E,
figure 5), and in doing so, undercut support for new forma-
tions. As Figure 4 shows, in 2016, with its shift toward the
economic left, FF’s programmatic offer was more similar
to the previous program of SF, the Socialists, or the new
Social Democrats. Similarly, FG with a shift toward cul-
tural liberalism came to resemble the Labour party. Rela-
tive to the two large parties which move in tandem, SF
distinguished itself in 2016 with a culturally left program-
matic appeal, a substantial shift compared to its culturally
centrist, economically left agenda in 2007 and 2011.
In Irish politics “without social basis” (Whyte, 1974),
large parties show remarkable resilience and new parties
remain marginal. The Irish example shows the difficulties
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new parties face in distinguishing themselves within a con-
text of programmatic instability. The large programmatic
shifts accompanied by low organizational turnover demon-
strate the importance of examining the two as separate
dimensions.
Figure 5 shows the MDS analysis of the Latvian polit-
ical space based on four elections (2006, 2010, 2011, and
2014). The arrows show movement by the party mostly in
government during the period of observation: New Era (JL)
— Unity (V) after 2010 — and the party of the Russian-
speaking minority, Harmony (S).
Despite having a consistently high level of extra-
systemic volatility, Latvia is characterized by a low level
of programmatic instability due to the anchor of sociocul-
tural divides. Most notable is the ethnic cleavage between
Latvian and Russian speakers. All parties take a clear posi-
tion on this divide, which splits Harmony (S) as the main
representative of the Russian minority and the Latvian Rus-
sian Union (PCTVL) from the rest of the parties in the party
system.
As Figure 5 shows, many parties compete in a narrow
space defined by renewing/reforming democracy, fighting
corruption, defense, and nationalism. Within this space,
parties’ stances toward corruption structure competition.
Before entering government in 2009, Unity (V) and its
predecessor New Era (JL) maintained a relatively stable
appeal based on anti-corruption. Once in government, the
party gradually refocused its anti-corruption appeal on eco-
nomic issues, reforming democracy, and increasing defense
capabilities (see Online Supplemental Material E, figure 6).
This dynamic illustrates the instrumental role anti-
corruption and a general call to reform the economy/
democracy play in advancing party success and new party
entry,5 at the same time proving the difficulty parties with a
similar programmatic appeal have in maintaining an anti-
corruption appeal after they enter government (also see
Engler, 2018: 62–70).
The Latvian case embodies the problem of party
replacement as the sole measure of party system stability.
The ethnic and the anti-corruption divide structures party
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competition and provide stability hidden by the extreme
volatility of party organizations.
Conclusion
Although party system stability is often reduced to the
stability of party organizations, programmatic stability pro-
vides an often-neglected dimension for understanding pat-
terns of party competition. As the empirical analysis shows,
the two are separate dimensions that do not always align.
This article examines their interaction.
This article makes two key contributions. First, the arti-
cle introduced a conceptual distinction between (1) stable
systems; (2) systems with programmatic stability and
ephemeral parties; (3) systems with stable but programma-
tically empty labels; and (4) instability. Second, it has oper-
ationalized and proposed a novel quantitative measure of
programmatic stability. This article demonstrates that when
programmatic stability is considered in addition to party
replacement, some cases from northwestern and southern
Europe show similar levels of instability to the eastern
European examples.
One limitation involves identifying the causes and con-
sequences of party replacement and programmatic instabil-
ity. In this regard, an important distinction the discussion
highlights is between election specific shocks and struc-
tural factors. The results suggest that it is in the context
of the Great Recession that programmatic instability rose in
southern Europe, and in some cases (e.g. Italy), new parties
achieved significant success. However, as the Irish exam-
ple shows, if the main competitors are able to credibly shift
their programmatic appeal, the shock is largely mitigated.
Some of the structural factors emphasized relate to the
difficulty junior coalition partners face in distinguishing
their programmatic appeal and to the role of societal clea-
vages in anchoring party competition even in a context of
high party turnover (e.g. Latvia).
From a normative perspective, this article has a mixed
message. In stable systems, change is accommodated. Nev-
ertheless, choices are meaningful, and conditions of
accountability are met. Under conditions of instability, both
the parties and their programmatic agenda radically
change, though instability is limited to specific moments
in time. In systems with ephemeral parties, choices are
consistent but individual parties have no incentive to stick
to their program given the uncertain fate that awaits them.
These systems do not allow the formation of long-term
identification between voters and parties. Where parties
survive but radically shift their programmatic agenda, sta-
ble labels deceive voters, since the conditions of account-
ability are only seemingly met. Depending on their
interaction, party replacement and programmatic instability
undermine or create the conditions for voters to hold parties
accountable.
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Notes
1. Leave-one-out mean centering is applied due to high variance
among a limited set of parties.
2. Unlike Powell and Tucker (2013), Mainwaring et al (2010) did
not include party exit in their calculation. I include party exit
since I consider party death a key mechanism of the narrowing
of the programmatic offer, and therefore, an internal compo-
nent of system-level programmatic volatility.
3. I operationalize the third criteria as having a leader who did not
run before.
4. Due to its low presence in the media, the positions of the Green
party cannot be estimated.
5. The most successful genuinely new Zatler’s Reform Party
(RP) mobilized on the same issue.
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